Wyoming launched a state-backed stablecoin on Solana, and Morgan Stanley filed for a Solana trust product this week. Last month, Visa expanded USDC settlement to run on Solana rails, and JPMorgan tokenized commercial paper using Solana for part of the settlement stack.
These are not rumors or roadmap promises. They happened over 60 days, and they force a cleaner question than the old binary: institutions are no longer asking whether to engage with Solana, but how much exposure and on which layer.
The “institutions won’t embrace Solana” claim survived as long as it did because it conflated two different bets: buying SOL exposure through wrappers like ETFs, and using Solana as infrastructure for settlement, stablecoin distribution, or tokenized assets.
The first is about risk appetite and regulatory clarity. The second is about operational requirements, such as speed, cost, uptime, and compliance surfaces.
What changed in 2025 was that both tracks began producing measurable outcomes simultaneously, making it harder to defend the blanket dismissal without ignoring the evidence.
Wyoming’s credibility hack
On Jan. 7, the Wyoming Stable Token Commission announced the Frontier Stable Token, a state-issued digital dollar backed by reserves managed by Franklin Templeton.
The token launched with distribution through Kraken on Solana and through Rain on Avalanche.
Wyoming is not a DeFi protocol or a speculative venture, but a US state with a regulatory mandate and fiduciary obligations. Additionally, Franklin Templeton is a $1.6 trillion asset manager.
The combination creates a compliance wrapper around Solana that institutions can point to when justifying integration. If a state government trusts the rails enough to distribute a reserve-backed token, the “Solana is too risky for real finance” argument loses most of its teeth.
Morgan Stanley filed initial registration statements for exchange-traded products tracking both Bitcoin and Solana on Jan. 6.
The filings describe them as trusts, which are spot-style wrappers that give investors regulated exposure without requiring direct custody or interaction with the blockchain.
What matters is that a Wall Street brand with $1.5 trillion in client assets under management is building distribution for Solana alongside Bitcoin, treating both as credible enough to justify the compliance overhead and reputational risk of a public filing.
This comes after the SEC approved generic listing standards for commodity-based crypto ETPs, reducing the need for case-by-case exchange approvals.
That procedural shift lowers the barrier to launching new products, which is why institutional observers expect a wave of altcoin ETPs in 2026.
JPMorgan estimated that altcoin ETFs could attract roughly $14 billion in their first six months, with approximately $6 billion flowing into Solana-focused products.
Those are forecasts, not guarantees, but they reflect institutional positioning: firms are modeling Solana as a meaningful share of crypto allocation, not as a niche retail bet.
Settlement rails matter more than price exposure
The more durable institutional story is not about SOL price or ETF inflows, but about Solana being used as settlement infrastructure for tokenized dollars and cash-like instruments.
Visa announced in December that it is expanding stablecoin settlement with USDC on Solana and bringing that capability to US-based institutions.
The firm reported approximately $3.5 billion in annualized stablecoin settlement volume across its network, and Solana’s speed and cost structure make it a natural fit for high-frequency, low-value payment flows that traditional rails struggle to handle efficiently.
JPMorgan’s experiment goes further. In December, JPMorgan issued JPM Coin-denominated commercial paper on a public blockchain using Solana for tokenization, alongside R3’s Corda for permissioned settlement.
This is short-term debt issued by a systemically important bank, tokenized and settled on Solana infrastructure.
The fact that JPMorgan is experimenting with Solana for collateral and settlement workflows signals that the bank views the chain as operationally viable for institutional finance, even if only as one component in a multi-chain architecture.
Solana’s stablecoin footprint supports this narrative. Data from DefiLlama shows that the chain holds nearly $15 billion in stablecoins, with USDC accounting for roughly 67% of that total, as of Jan. 7.
Daily on-chain activity shows around 2.37 million active addresses, 67.34 million transactions, and $6.97 billion in DEX volume over the past 24 hours.
Tokenized real-world assets on Solana total approximately $871.4 million in distributed asset value, representing roughly 4.5% of the RWA market, a share that grew 10.5% over the past 30 days.
Addressing the centralization critique
The most persistent institutional objection to Solana has been the risk of centralization: client monoculture, stake concentration, validator economics, and infrastructure requirements that favor well-capitalized operators.
The launch of Firedancer, a second validator client built by Jump Crypto, directly addresses the client monoculture problem. Firedancer went live on Solana mainnet on Dec. 12, allowing validators to choose between two clients rather than relying solely on the Solana Labs implementation.
That reduces the chance that a single bug or exploit halts the entire network, which was the tail risk that kept some institutions on the sidelines.
But Firedancer does not solve every centralization concern. Stake distribution remains concentrated among a small number of validators, and delegation inertia means that stake tends to flow toward the largest, most visible operators.
Solana’s own network health reporting shows approximately 1,295 validators and a Nakamoto coefficient around 20 as of an April 2025 snapshot, better than many proof-of-stake chains, but still far from the decentralization profile of Bitcoin or Ethereum.
Institutions will price this as governance and operational risk: who can influence upgrades, how fast critical patches roll out, and whether validator economics remain sustainable under stress.
The institutional calculation is not “is Solana decentralized enough,” but is it “the risk bounded and manageable.” Client diversity reduces systemic risk, and validator count and geographic distribution reduce single-point-of-failure concerns.
Operational playbooks for handling outages and monitoring tools for tracking network health make integration into compliance frameworks easier.
| Centralization critique (the claim) | What it means in practice | Reality check (what’s true / what’s improved) | Remaining risk (what still matters) | How institutions price it (what it affects) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| “Solana is centralized because it’s basically one client.” | If most validators run the same codebase, a single bug can become a network-wide incident. | The client-monoculture critique has weakened as Solana moves toward multi-client validation (with Firedancer as the “second client” milestone). This reduces single-software tail risk. | Client diversity only helps if adoption becomes meaningful (share of stake/validators actually running each client), and if incident response isn’t still coordinated through a narrow set of actors. | Operational risk & outage risk → integration approval, settlement limits, business continuity requirements. |
| “Stake is concentrated, so decentralization is cosmetic.” | A small set of entities can dominate consensus influence via delegated stake. | High validator counts don’t automatically mean low concentration; critics are right that delegation inertia often funnels stake to large, visible operators. | Concentration can persist even as the network grows; if large operators or custodians dominate delegation, “decentralization optics” remain fragile. | Governance risk premium → higher internal haircuts, smaller initial caps, stricter counterparties. |
| “Validator requirements favor whales; it’s not accessible.” | If hardware, bandwidth, and ops costs are high, fewer independent validators can compete. | Performance-oriented design does raise operating costs relative to some chains; institutions accept that tradeoff if it buys speed and predictable execution. | If economics compress (fees drop, rewards fall), weaker validators exit → concentration rises. | Sustainability risk → vendor due diligence, long-term support concerns, “is this a durable rail?” questions. |
| “It’s centralized because it runs on a few cloud providers / regions.” | Hosting concentration creates correlated failure and censorship/regulatory choke points. | Even with many validators, correlated infrastructure can be a hidden single point of failure. The critique is often about where validators run, not just how many exist. | Geographic/provider clustering can spike during stress events; regulatory pressure can have outsized impact if key operators sit in a small set of jurisdictions. | Censorship & continuity risk → jurisdictional controls, disaster recovery posture, vendor concentration limits. |
| “A small group can push upgrades fast; that’s centralized governance.” | Rapid upgrades can imply social centralization (coordination dominated by a narrow set of teams/operators). | Fast iteration can be a feature for institutions if it’s predictable, transparent, and well-governed (change management). | If upgrades feel opaque or rushed, it reads as governance centralization—especially after incidents. | Change-management risk → slower rollouts, gating with maintenance windows, strict versioning policies. |
| “RPCs/infrastructure are centralized, so institutions still rely on a few gatekeepers.” | Even if validators are distributed, most users route through a handful of RPC providers, creating choke points. | This is a real centralization layer for many apps—often more important than validator count for user access and reliability. | If a few RPCs throttle, fail, or restrict access, the chain’s perceived reliability suffers regardless of consensus decentralization. | Reliability & vendor risk → multi-RPC requirements, SLAs, failover architecture, higher integration cost. |
| “MEV / priority fees centralize power in sophisticated actors.” | Ordering advantages accrue to those with best infra, best routing, best relationships—raising fairness/market-integrity concerns. | High-throughput chains can still concentrate “execution advantage” even if consensus is distributed. | If MEV becomes too extractive or opaque, it harms institutional comfort (best execution, market integrity). | Market structure risk → compliance review, execution policies, venue choice, surveillance requirements. |
| “Centralization risk is why ‘serious finance’ won’t settle here.” | Institutions won’t touch rails they can’t explain to regulators/auditors. | The existence of regulated wrappers and credible settlement experiments suggests the absolute claim no longer holds; institutions can work with bounded risk. | “Engagement” ≠ “full reliance.” Many institutions will keep Solana as one leg in a multi-rail architecture until risk is demonstrably managed over time. | Adoption curve → pilots first, capped volumes, gradual expansion tied to KPIs and incident-free time. |
Three scenarios for the next 12 months
The cleanest way to assess whether institutions are truly embracing Solana is to track three measurable outcomes over the next year.
The first is the “wrapper wave,” measured by whether Morgan Stanley’s filings and the SEC’s streamlined listing standards lead to a faster cadence of Solana ETP launches and whether those products attract meaningful assets under management.
The base case is that Solana wrappers gather low single-digit billions in AUM if distribution is broad and liquidity remains deep. The bull case aligns with JPMorgan’s estimates for Solana-focused products, which are in the $6 billion range.
However, the fail mode is that approvals happen, but demand is thin, and flows concentrate in Bitcoin and Ethereum anyway.
The second is the “rails first” scenario, observable in whether Visa’s settlement expansion and other banks’ or fintechs’ pilots choose Solana for stablecoin and tokenized cash workflows.
The barometer here is Solana’s stablecoin market cap and the quality of issuers and holders. If new regulated issuers launch on Solana and if stablecoin growth reflects institutional use rather than DeFi speculation, the rails thesis strengthens.
The regulatory environment is also shifting in Solana’s favor. The GENIUS Act, which aims to create a federal stablecoin framework, is being viewed by institutional researchers as a potential catalyst for on-chain money adoption.
Citi forecasts stablecoin issuance could reach $1.9 trillion in a base case and $4 trillion in a bull case by 2030.
The third is a backlash or re-risking scenario triggered by a major incident, such as a network halt, an exploit, or a governance optics spike that causes institutional pilots to pause.
The tell would be stablecoin issuers reducing exposure, wrappers underperforming, and a return to the “Solana is too risky” narrative.
What to watch as proof of concept
The debate will be resolved through data, not declarations.
Solana’s stablecoin market cap and issuer mix, settlement credibility signals from Visa and other payments players, RWA distributed asset value on Solana, ETP pipeline density, client diversity adoption beyond Firedancer’s initial launch, and liquidity depth across DEX and CEX venues are all measurable over the next six to twelve months.
If those metrics improve and if no major operational failures occur, the “institutions won’t embrace Solana” thesis becomes untenable.
What is already clear is that the question has shifted from legitimacy to scale. Institutions are engaging with Solana through wrappers, through settlement experiments, and through stablecoin distribution.
The remaining uncertainty is not whether they will touch it, but how much weight they will put on it and under what conditions.
